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The Death Detectives: An Introduction  
 
Elizabeth Cotton 
 
The Death Detectives event took place at The Photographers’ Gallery in 
London on the 3rd December 2015 - an event to talk about, urm, death. This 
was the fastest selling event in the Gallery’s history, something you would not 
have put money on. Since when did a bunch of psychoanalytically minded 
folk staring into the abyss attract such a crowd? 
 
Freud talked about the practice of psychoanalysis as like the work of a 
detective. Fragments and remains - unconscious and conscious - offer us 
evidence for the stories of our lives that have become obscured. Investigating 
the details of the psychic crime scenes a way to uncover our reality.  
 
Forensic photography, like psychoanalysis, aimed to develop a protocol - the 
rules by which photography can be considered factual and providing 
evidence. The scientific nature of such protocols is contested terrain in both 
photography and psychoanalysis, whether links can be made between the 
forensic details to the now hidden course of events. 
 
Walking through the Burden of Proof exhibition, the parallels between 
psychoanalysis and forensic photography are striking. 
 
The father of forensic photography, Alphonse Bertillon, working as head of 
photography for the Paris police force, developed the first protocol for 
systematically recording the crime scene - using a technique of Photographie 
Metrique. Using a tripod to take a bird’s eye view, the victim is placed in the 
middle of the picture, with the details of the scene all given equal attention. A 
non-judgemental perspective. The photographs are surrounded by a metric 
ruler, to measure the relative distance between these details. This includes a 
simulated wooden ‘sill’ at the bottom of the page, a tender attempt to formally 
frame the crime, to contain the violence of the images within.  
 
This forensic perspective speaks to the position of the patient under the 
analytic microscope. Sometimes experienced as a cold autopsy, the blood and 
guts of the psychic investigation. Analyst as pathologist. While at the same 
time the objectivity of the protocol creating a space for a benign observer, 
someone to cooly make sense of the psychically raw data.  
 
In the next room of the Burden of Proof exhibition is the abstract work of 
Rodolpe Reiss - Bertillon’s student - who set up the first forensic school at the 
neutral University of Lousanne. The images in this section are close up 
abstract images of the details of crime scenes. A blood splatter on white fabric, 
a folded handkerchief, scratches on a dark floor. For such scientific images 
they profoundly draw the viewer in - demanding us to understand them.   
 
This attention to detail is paralleled in psychoanalysis - the insistence on the 
significance of the small things. That a mark on the body or a dream, if 
interpreted can uncover real meaning in the world. They are both systems 
that accept the truth of the details and their relevance to understanding the 
human story behind them.  
 
This is a further link between forensic photography and psychoanalysis, the 
necessity of the detective’s work for us to interpret and make sense of the 
details as part of a bigger picture. The proposal of the Death Detectives is that 
however factual the data is, ultimately it requires interpretation. Someone 
always has to understand what is being shown. This is a profoundly 
humanistic view, where we are dependent on each other to do this detective 
work of knowing and understanding reality, including the certainty of death. 
A human story pieced together by other humans. 
 
This event took place just three weeks after the Paris shootings. The political 
and social crisis that November 13th is part of came close to the world of 
photography, happening at the time of Paris Photo, with many people from 
the photography world including staff from The Photographers’ Gallery were 
there. The exhibition itself was curated in France - coming out of a powerful 
French intellectualism, unafraid of conceptualism and complexity. This 
position that promotes ideas and their everyday use to understand human 
experience is one that we should cherish.  
 
The Death Detectives event and the eBook that accompanies it, is motivated 
by the belief that by allowing the knowledge of death into our lives we can 
live life more fully. Together.  
 
/ /  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do Not Go Gentle Into that Good Night 
 
David Morgan 
 
 
Do not go gentle into that good night,  
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;  
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.  
Though wise men at their end know dark is right,  
Because their words had forked no lightning they  
Do not go gentle into that good night.  
Good men, the last wave by, crying how bright  
Their frail deeds might have danced in a green bay,  
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.  
Wild men who caught and sang the sun in flight,  
And learn, too late, they grieved it on its way,  
Do not go gentle into that good night.  
Grave men, near death, who see with blinding sight  
Blind eyes could blaze like meteors and be gay,  
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.  
And you, my father, there on that sad height,  
Curse, bless, me now with your fierce tears, I pray.  
Do not go gentle into that good night.  
Rage, rage against the dying of the light. 
 
Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night (1951) 
 
 
I want to tell you a story about how the struggle between life and death forces 
appear in an analyst's consulting room.  
 
I have found through my work as a psychoanalyst that we all work 
unconsciously to distort and blunt our acceptance of profound human 
experiences such as death but that traumatic events may destine some people 
unconsciously to devote all their efforts to subvert the recognition of these 
facts as an activity in place of living.   
Roger Money-Kyrle psychoanalyst and philosopher, wrote that it is useful to 
consider three core facts of life which are; “the recognition of dependency , 
the recognition of a couple creating life as a profound creative act, and the 
recognition of the inevitability of time and ultimately death”.   
He went on to say about this third ‘fact’ that “to fear death is not the same as 
to recognize its inevitability, which is a fact forced on us much against our 
will by the repeated experience that no good (or bad) experience can ever last 
for ever—a fact perhaps never fully accepted”.   
We are all defended against the painful recognition of these facts. However 
poor our experiences may have been, we must all have had some experience 
of nurturing and we are all the products of a procreative union that made us 
but inevitably excluded us.  We lose love and hope and struggle to re-find it 
and we all fear exclusion and ultimately the exclusion that comes through 
death.  It is only perhaps as we grope our way to understanding that good and 
nurturing experiences are all transient in reality but must be kept alive 
psychically that any of us are able to experience hope for ourselves and 
others. 
My work leads me to believe that it is the process of the analyst bearing to 
face these facts afresh for themselves whilst bombarded with death-fear and 
resistance in the transference that may begin to allow inklings of digested 
realisation to be taken in by the other.  
 
 
 
A clinical story 
The personal details of this story are disguised to protect anonymity and the 
person who agreed to my using her material also now lives abroad.  
I want to talk about the difficulties of managing as a psychoanalyst when 
working with people whose grasp on life is tenuous and who unconsciously 
enact and provoke enormous concerns particular for themselves and their 
families. Also to think about whether it is possible or worthwhile to live in the 
"shadow of death" that some people work strenuously to remain under.  
Rebecca was a bright and successful medic. She had become depressed and 
incapacitated in her work, socially isolated within the confines of her flat, and 
she was very lonely.  She had tried to cope with this situation by becoming 
more involved with her work but looking after others didn't help and she felt 
unable to continue. 
The intellectual defenses that she had employed to get on and be successful 
in her life so far, including migrating from another country, speaking another 
language and excelling in exams, were beginning to fail her.  
She had also begun seriously to lose weight. She informed me that she had 
recently begun to frighten herself whilst alone in her flat, having 
hallucinations of her dead mother in the back garden looking in through the 
window at her.   
She also imagined black birds flying through her flat.  This felt both genuine, 
but accompanied by a memory of wanting to jump into her mother’s grave 
after her premature death.  
 In this melodramatic account of her state of mind it was possible to see both 
real feelings of pain and loneliness but also some evidence of her exciting 
herself over death. One way of managing the fear of it is to create horror 
movies. It's shy young people like the horror genre. An inner deathliness was 
in danger of taking her over.  Despite my instant reaction of alarm about her 
weakened state and a hopelessness about her, I decided to see her. 
Rebecca had some traumatic experiences that left their capacity to manage 
the fear of loss of love and death disabled.  In turn I felt myself also to be 
similarly disabled at times, and I was forced to begin with to live as they had 
done with visions of the chasm. As my work developed understanding these 
fears in relation to my patients’ unconscious life played its part in enabling 
me to provide a more or less adequate container for my her, and enabled her 
to begin to think and feel about these facts of life as they had not dared to 
before.  
Rebecca was not from this country. She was the fourth child in a family of 
seven. Her mother developed breast cancer around the patient’s fifth birthday 
and this involved her being away for extensive treatments in a city some 
distance from the family home.  
Her mother’s anxiety for her children seemed lead her as often happens to 
emphasise the need for her children to get on and make the most of their 
academic prowess. There was a strong family history of cancer and there had 
been several deaths. At least passing exams gives a semblance of control over 
things. 
It was a feature of the early months that she had many colds and flus, which 
she seemed to catch easily and hold onto.  She always looked cold and weak 
and as if she needed to wear more clothes which evoked in me an interesting 
state of mind, one of exasperation at her helplessness, rather than concern 
about her self neglect over time I came to understand these early feelings of 
mine were related to her relationship with a mother who simply had no 
capacity to take care of her and who wanted her to take care of herself.  
I initially found seeing her rather draining, as presumably, Her mother had 
found looking after her family draining when she needed to be looked after 
herself. 
At an early she was sent to a boarding school, following in the footsteps of her 
sisters.  Throughout her time there she did well academically whilst at the 
same time managing to be rebellious.   
Her mother did die after a long struggle when Rebecca was 20. This tragically 
was closely followed by her father’s death after only six months. It seemed 
that he couldn’t survive mother’s passing. Rebecca responded to all this by 
working hard academically. 
Rebecca's history showed very considerable emotional privation and there had 
clearly been a divorce between her work-self and her emotions.  
I think this dynamic is a part of working with many people who fill up the 
dark holes in their lives by distancing them from any need for others by 
creating relationships with substances, things, ideas that obviate the need for 
dangerous love, and it's corollary vulnerability, indeed they often create loss 
and pain in the people around them whilst they pursue preoccupations that 
fill them their minds and bodies, whilst the real person is excluded and 
diminished.  
In our second meeting she told me that in her view she would be unable to 
conceive of getting help from me and continuing to work.  Instead she had 
been looking at advertisements to become a street cleaner for her local 
borough, this cleaning up other peoples’ stuff evolved from an unconscious 
phantasy of cleaning other people's mess up rather than dealing with her own. 
She posed a dilemma as I did think it was reasonable for her to consider not 
working whilst she was clearly in such a vulnerable state.  On the other hand, 
she had no financial cushion to fall back on.  Her alternative job choice was 
evidently dangerous as it was then the middle of winter and her current 
physical health was very fragile. 
I was confronted immediately by my reactions to her depleted mental and 
physical states.  I began to realise that she was insistently bringing the reality 
of death and deadly states into my room.  To manage this first dilemma of life 
and death, I could only fall back on my theory and the setting.. 
I was in no position to make decisions for her my task was just to try and see 
how she responded to our working together.  I said that "she seemed to find it 
difficult to conceive of both getting help and helping herself; it seemed that it 
had to be one or the other."   
Again, I came to see this as a re-enactment of the experience being with a 
mother who could not help.  She was forever tempted to regress to infantile 
dependency in order, I think, to try to find someone to depend on.  With great 
difficulty she continued to work.  The pattern of her employment followed a 
similar path, in that she would often feel over-burdened and expected to do 
too much. 
The first two years of our work was quite harrowing.  It seemed that I had to 
live with her within the anxiety that she might die.  She was deeply depressed, 
always with a cold, had very little money and was without any apparent social 
or family contacts.  
The first dream she ever brought seemed to be a fairly accurate 
representation of her internal state. 
"I am standing on a stage and I am overlooking a swimming pool full of dead 
male bodies.  They had all died due to some mysterious disease and seemed to 
be floating horrible substance.  In the distance a little boat is coming toward 
me that is picking up the dead bodies."  
Rebecca was unable to think or say more about this powerful dream but I was 
able to use it to help me understand more about her.  I kept in mind the 
waters seemed to be a negative version of “the waters of the 
unconscious”,  “dangerous waters” in which you don’t swim.   
I saw the dead people as symbols of her frozen, dissociated emotions, 
especially feelings, which seemed to have been annihilated. That they were 
men seemed significant. I felt her identification with her dying mother had 
left her with the sense that she herself was deadly.  The boat, I thought might 
be seen as an ego, or the hope of a thinking ego that might develop, and that 
might “pick up” i.e. understand her dead, frozen self.  I wondered if I might be 
partly represented by the boat, but It was a daunting task. This ‘aid’ in her 
mind clearly came with the price of risk of very severe contamination. 
At the time I interpreted to her that the dream seemed to indicate her fear 
that her mind and thoughts would be lethal to anyone who came into contact 
with her, particularly men including me.  She lived in fear of repelling me 
and the men she began to meet.  
Another dream later in our work shows, I think, how Rebecca was beginning 
to use our work. 
“I am lying on a bed on the side of a partition, on the other side of which is an 
old nun on a trampoline who is jumping up and down, trying to see over at 
me.” 
By this time we were able to think together about this view of a rather 
frustrated, possibly celibate person excitedly trying to reach her.  The nun 
seemed to me clearly to be a reference to her own celibate perhaps child like 
self, but it could also be an unflattering attack on me, her analyst, as a celibate 
impotent person, which in this phase I often felt myself to be.  But we could 
not ignore the manifest shape of the dream in which someone was jumping 
up and down to see something and in the manner of dreams this, I felt, was 
her becoming excited about being close to someone who at least seemed to be 
interested to see her, even if she had to turn them into an old nun or herself 
into a sexless being.  
Over time her conception of herself as a lethal being began to emerge. I 
would say that she brought her deadness for the first time to someone who 
she hoped might convert it into thought and life.  
There was some illness at one point and this forced us both to to confront her 
mortal (as well as now sexual) body, and after considerable work this led her 
into engaging with her own and my mortality as real things to be thought 
about. 
 This brought in turn grief for her mother and father’s deaths.   
This seemed to me to come from a recognition of Money-Kyrle’s facts of life. 
namely that her she was the result of a procreative act and that she had 
somewhere inside her knowledge of something good that they had given her 
before they cruelly died. 
Bearing the facts of life 
At times her fear for me joined with my own fear for me and us and I would 
mirror her in finding thought about our mortality overwhelming.  Again, I 
depended on the setting and my own analytic perspective to help us. 
At times she experienced real terror that if we talk about death the inevitable 
happens.  It was of vital importance at these times that I was prepared to 
entertain the uncomfortable idea of my own death and my own limitations.  It 
was an exploration of my capacity to cope with the thought of death and 
dying without defensively interpreting this fear away, or reassuring her, or 
indeed expiring on the spot.  
This question about life and death became the focus of a great deal of 
exploration with me.  
How do I, an older man, live with the knowledge of my own mortality, a 
reasonable question for someone whose own people seemed to have been 
dogged by and succumbed to such fears all her life?  
This exploration of my capacity to cope with her streams of emotion about 
my death was an important ongoing aspect of her analysis.  
As I survived, her ambivalence towards life abated and her fear that I would 
reject her increased.  We could see this perhaps, to quote early Freud, as 
"hysterical misery turned to common unhappiness".   
For these sorts of people the facts of life are intolerable as they have never 
experienced a mind able to think about long enough rather than succumb to 
their power of these facts. 
This left her in a world where she could only enact their problems.It was 
essential with both that she was eventually able to manage terrors around the 
fear of death and disintegration so that these frightening thoughts could 
become symbolised in the patients’ own material.    
As a human I know that I struggle too at times to accept the three facts of life 
particularly the last one. The tool that I make use of is my belief in 
psychoanalysis. We all need mental space like Rebecca  in which to deal with 
them. 
 
"Rage against the dying of the light!!" 
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The Timing of Death: Before it Time, Long 
Overdue or Just in Time? 
 
Steve Fuller 
 
A key issue in the forensics of death is the timing of death. CSI-style television 
programs tend to presume that the death under investigation has occurred 
‘before its time’ and hence is likely to have been the result of a crime. The 
overall effect of this initial judgement is to raise the value of the deceased 
person’s life – especially in terms of its unrealized potential. Indeed, people’s 
long-term reputations are very much affected by the perceived timing of their 
death -- and the extent to which it arrested an ‘unrealized potential’. Thus, we 
speak of (usually but not always) younger people as ‘cut down in their prime’. 
But equally, and perhaps more interestingly, people’s reputations may suffer 
because, so to speak, they outstay their welcome among the living by failing 
either to remain brilliant or diminish gracefully. A good current case in point 
may be James D. Watson, youthful co-discoverer of DNA’s double-helix 
structure, who in later life has tried to leverage his expertise in genetics to 
make periodic interventions in public debates that have been widely received 
as ‘racist’. 
 
That the value of a person’s life may increase with early death and diminish 
with late death is routine in the post-mortem judgements we make of 
‘creative’ people. The paradigm case is the English Romantic poets, some of 
whom died at thirty and others at eighty. The reputations of the longer-lived 
poets (Coleridge, Wordsworth) suffered, whereas those of the shorter-lived 
poets (Keats, Shelley) benefitted. The former are stigmatized for having 
become more reactionary, whereas the latter are presumed to have possessed 
unfulfilled promise – even though with age they too might have become 
reactionary. In my own field of sociology, the great Max Weber was spared the 
reputational fate of his equally clever rival Werner Sombart, who lived twenty 
years longer than Weber -- just in time to endorse the Nazi regime. In our own  
time, the radical glow that continues to surround Michel Foucault is abetted 
by his death in 1984, just before the neo-liberalism towards which he was 
already inching came to acquire a hegemonic grip on the world-order. Had he 
lived another twenty years, Foucault might have come to be reviled as the 
intellectual godfather of the ‘quantified self’.  
 
Might human relations not be improved if we could think in terms of an 
optimal moment of death for which we and others might plan, eventuating in 
every death becoming a ‘suicide’ in the strict sense? Indeed, might there not 
be an art to the timing of one’s death – to go out with a bang, not a whimper, 
as it were?  To be sure, there is a classical tone to these questions. After all, the 
Roman Stoic Seneca held that as soon as the quantity of life outstrips its 
quality, suicide becomes an option. The appeal of this maxim is perhaps most 
naturally understood in terms of the prospect of living an increasingly 
degraded life, say, through debilitating illness or even declining socio-
economic status. However, in the future, as we come to live longer, healthier 
lives – perhaps indefinitely – we may be simply left with too much time on 
our hands, such that what now may look like a life of endless leisure turns out 
in practice to provide endless opportunities for reputational damage through 
mishaps and misjudgments. 
 
Here it is worth recalling the modus operandi of one famous rational suicide 
in Seneca’s sense. In the forensic treatment presented in The Trial of Socrates, 
the great latter-day American muckraker, I.F. Stone, concluded that Socrates 
deliberately took his own life both out of contempt for a democracy that 
would regard him as a national security threat and because he did not relish 
the prospect of ending his days as a decrepit old man under constant 
suspicion. Thus, Socrates wanted to make the denouement of his life appear as 
dramatic as possible – and of course succeeded, courtesy of Plato. In the 
future, the Socratic exit may be planned longer in advance, as improvements 
in ambient levels of health allow people to determine the exact moment of 
departure to ensure maximum impact. In this context, understanding the 
mindset of today’s suicide bombers would not go amiss. Looking ahead, 
ordinary acts of murder may even come to be routinely defended on grounds 
of euthanasia, if a physically fit but socially dysfunctional person refuses to 
make a graceful departure from the land of the living. In any case, the more 
brutal forms of political realism – as depicted in, say, the UK/US television 
series House of Cards – have long upheld this practice. 
 
Clearly a value reorientation is required to take the idea of an optimal death 
seriously. For a start, death would have to be seen not as something that 
happens to you but something that you choose to happen. Immanuel Kant 
can be held responsible for launching this general sensibility. His ‘categorical 
imperative’ implies that any death that I would allow to others, I also allow to 
myself. Jean-Paul Sartre exploited this intuition when he held all of humanity 
responsible for the 1945 Allied bombing of Hiroshima, which meant that we 
must all be ready to face a nuclear death – to be sure, a default sentiment in 
the ensuing Cold War. However, such assertions of the voluntary nature of 
death have always had a faintly absurd quality to them, one raised to self-
consciousness by Sartre’s own Existentialist movement.  After all, under 
normal circumstances we do not control the moment of our death, however 
much we may wish or feel compelled to take responsibility for it. The 1964 
Stanley Kubrick film Dr. Strangelove unleashed the black comic potential of 
this premise to great effect.  
 
Nevertheless, to claim that a death happened ‘optimally’ is to imply the 
prospect of just this level of control over life and death – specifically, that the 
value of the deceased’s life might be enhanced by death more than by 
continuing to live. Inheritance law – and specifically the well-named ‘last will 
and testament’ – offers a first pass at the issues involved, given the well-
documented intergenerational struggles over who is best fit to take 
collectively owned capital forward. However, these disputes have typically 
transpired in the context of preparing for inevitable but unpredictable 
succession. Nowadays we are countenancing a world in which a departure 
planned the right way might increase the capital of all concerned – both the 
posthumous reputation of the deceased and the financial base of the collective 
enterprise in question. Here one might think of what the father of public 
relations, Edward Bernays, called a ‘tie-in’, namely, an event outside of one’s 
control that can be turned into an opportunity to boost one’s fortunes – in this 
case by legitimizing suicide or possibly euthanasia (formerly known as 
‘murder’). After all, it worked for Socrates. 
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Forensic Imaginary 
Martina Caruso 
 
In Eyal Weizman’s edited volume Forensis (2014), which featured in The 
Photographers’ Gallery exhibition Burden of Proof: the Construction of Visual 
Evidence, he speaks about the ‘forensic imagination’ as a space in which it is 
possible to creatively retrieve affects. Looking at the photographs and videos 
of death on display, I found myself trying to get away from what they 
represented and connect them to a different imaginary, perhaps indeed a 
forensic one.  
 
While Diane Dufour, the co-curator, in a video interview plays a cautious 
game with the vocabulary she uses, never straying from the idea of  
‘representing forensics’, it seems there is a mixture of wanting to challenge 
the idea of what might be acceptable to show in an art gallery space and, I 
think, an imperceptible sense of shame at the desacralising gesture this might 
imply. Dufour, cleverly avoiding the question of ‘art’ and ‘non-art’, remains 
faultless in her professionalism, quasi-forensic in her presentation of the ‘facts’ 
of the show, and yet because of this veneer there is an inability to 
acknowledge the strange, emotional, human undercurrents implied by such 
an exhibition about death.  
 
Perhaps it is from this (projected?) sense of shame that I found myself filling 
in the gaps in my mind about death and making connections between the 
photographs and videos on the walls with art works I have seen elsewhere, a 
part of me wishing that they were what I was looking at instead.  
Thierry De Duve wrote about the way in which non-art works (e.g. scientific 
photographs) tend to be legitimised in art institutions by comparing them 
with existing art works. In his article ‘Art in the Face of Radical Evil’ (October, 
Summer 2008), De Duve discusses Christian Caujolle’s curatorial choice to 
exhibit one hundred portraits of victims of the Cambodian genocide at the 
1997 Arles photography festival, Les Rencontres photographique d’Arles. 
Because the photographs had been acquired by the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York, the MoMA curators and Caujolle unconsciously ended up creating 
a new ‘aesthetic category – that of genocidal images’. In a way, the curators of 
Burden of Proof are doing something similar, while masking their desire to 
discuss the works as ‘art’. As a result, perhaps unconsciously, I was unable to 
think of anything else but art and aesthetics while seeing the show, maybe in 
an effort to render the frustratingly forensic as subjective and private as 
possible.  
 
My mind jumped from the US military aerial photographs of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki after the bomb to thinking of Jananne Al-Ani’s beautiful and eerie 
film stills from the video Shadow Sites II (2011). Al-Ani herself was influenced 
by Edward Steichen’s early aerial reconnaissance photographs from the First 
World War over the trenches of the Western Front. The dehumanised 
perspective that an aerial view of a landscape offers is somehow akin to short-
sightedness: it won’t allow the viewer to engage with the gritty gory detail of 
people dying in the landscape, and looks instead more like an abstract 
expressionist painting. The vagueness of such a view allows for no knowledge 
of the pain and death suffered by civilians in such raids.  
 
Some of the most beautiful works in the exhibition were by the Swiss forensic 
photographer Rodolphe A. Reiss. His details from crime scenes show close-ups 
of pieces of evidence: a dark glass bottle, marks on the floor, a footprint. Their 
simplicity is aesthetically attractive. For a moment I thought I might be 
looking at something else, not connected to murder and death, but to the 
everyday, to life. Instead of applying myself like a forensic detective trying to 
fill in the missing detail, I found myself looking for a trompe-l’oeil where 
there wasn’t one, a symbolic meaning even. Larry Sultan and Mike Mandel’s 
work Evidence (1975 -1977) came to mind, in which they appropriated work 
from scientific and governmental sources, and made them act as surreal, 
displaced, forensic evidence. I found myself seeking to undermine the concept 
of the exhibition through its artistic similars.  
 Even the German scientist Richard Helmer’s creepy montages from 1985 
which reconstitute Josef Mengele’s face through his skull brought me back to 
an exhibition in Edinburgh where I saw Christine Borland’s Homme Double 
(1997) sculptural project. Borland’s work managed to transcend the forensic 
paradigm: she invited six sculptors to sculpt Mengele’s head according to six 
contradictory descriptions of the man and six photographs taken many years 
apart. The resulting sculptures were, inevitably, different. Borland moved the 
realm of the objective and the scientific into the human, the inexact, the 
subjective. By placing his six slightly different heads, as busts on plinths, 
Borland allows for a phenomenological, three-dimensional experience of the 
forensic examination, in a way asking viewers to position themselves with 
regard to the doctor-murderer. None of these experiences or feelings can 
really emerge from the photographs, which as forensic evidence, are not 
allowed to be more than facts.  
 
The photographs of Russians on death row under Stalin’s Great Terror in the 
1930s were a direct reminder of De Duve’s critique of Caujolle’s hotly debated 
curatorial choice to show the portraits of the victims of the Cambodian 
genocide in 1997. In his article, De Duve questions the humanist fallacy which 
assumes that every work of art, once accepted into an art institution, speaks of 
humanity, noting that this definition ignores the criminals and torturers, who 
are also a part of humanity. In the end, De Duve suggests that the 
responsibility to address the people in the photographs lies fully with the 
viewer in the case of genocidal images, since the victims had already been 
dehumanised into things beneath the photographer’s gaze, even before they 
were killed.  
 
In this way, he connects with Roland Barthes’ writing on photography and 
death. Alexander Gardner’s photograph of Lewis Payne in 1865, waiting to be 
executed, inspired Barthes’ discussion in Camera Lucida of how every 
photograph, not just the photographs of the executed, ‘tells me death in the 
future’ […] Whether or not the subject is already dead, every photograph is 
this catastrophe.’ Barthes’s argument, which values the emotional, poignant 
response to photography transforms the ‘professional’ forensic attitude into 
one of the forensic imagination, in which spending time alone with the gazes 
of those who were about to die opens up a strange world of longing, a longing 
to know who the people in those photographs were.  
 
// 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the Life I Got Left 
 
Matt Gieve 
 
In the cult 1979 film The Warriors, Swan - the leader of the gang - and Mercy, 
his soon-to-be-girl, walk along a New York subway track having just escaped 
the police.  After a series of jibes about her promiscuity Mercy confronts him:  
 
“Look, what do you got against me?  You’ve been picking on me all 
night.” 
 
“I don’t like the way you live’ he says, “I don’t think you can remember 
who you get on Friday and Saturday nights. I don’t think you can 
remember what they look like.” 
 
“Sometimes I can and sometimes I can’t.”  She replies, “Who gives a 
damn? I see what’s happening next door and down the block. Belly 
hanging down, five kids, cockroaches in the cupboard. I’ll tell you what I 
want. I want something now. This is the life I got left. You know what I 
mean? You get it Warrior, huh? Get it?”  
 
There are many limits on life but the most binding of these is time.  Death 
gives life urgency. A sentiment encapsulated succinctly by the latter-day 
philosopher of excess, Drake in his 2011 single The Motto, where the motto is 
YOLO: You Only Live Once. Such is the urgency he uses and acronym to save 
time. 
 
While YOLO has since become a hackneyed internet meme, an ironic 
hashtag: ‘just drank a full-fat Coke, YOLO’, it also captures a particular 
cultural attitude toward death.  If we can assume Drake’s major preoccupation 
is not with the biological fact of mortality so much as the imperative this 
gives to the living, then it can be read a rap version of the aphorism “you 
might be run over by a bus tomorrow.”  
 
Death says don’t leave it till later, do it now.  This is the life I got left. You 
know what I mean?  
 
I was reassured, for the purposes of this seeming a sufficiently high-brow 
piece, to find that YOLO is originally attributed to Goethe, appearing in his 
1774 play Clavigo, as “Man lebt nur einmal in der Welt.” - One lives but once 
in the world – (or to give it the Drake treatment OLBOITW). It then made its 
way through various iterations, such as Mae West’s longhand version “You 
only live once, but if you do it right, once is enough” (YOLOBIYDIROIE), to 
Drake, to whom it finally fell to bring some much needed simplicity (YOLO). 
It appears that this imperative to haste is something that people have felt in 
different historical times, that despite great differences in the way we live, 
some features of life may be shared: a reassuring communion over the ages? 
 
Phillipe Aries, the great French social historian of death, argues not. Death, 
like life, is different now.  And in fact it is one thing we’ve been getting worse 
at.  Contrary to the prevailing direction of change over the last millennium, 
death has been getting wilder over time: transforming from the comparative 
comfort of the tame death in the early Middle Ages, through various 
configurations to the forbidden or denied death of today (or of the 1970s).  
 
Aries points to a range of factors to explain this shift:  To our waning 
familiarity with death, both forestalled by medicine and ever more private 
when it does occur; and to sweeping secularisation eroding a once impeccable 
confidence in life beyond death. Bound up with this, the consequences of 
scientific revolution, and in particular the insights of Darwin repositioning 
human kind within nature itself.  The human now just so much one more 
animal, a biological organism with no soul to outlive its flesh. If it were not 
true before, nowadays we REALLY do only live once.   
While this might address the question of Only Living Once, it does not fully 
speak to the question of who it is that is doing so?  The final and crucial factor 
in our shifting experience of death is the emergence of the individual: the self 
in its modern form.  This change has dual effects.  First, the process of greater 
Individualisation starts to undermine a once assumed position in a greater 
shared continuity, though either family or clan, increasingly isolating the 
individual within the bounds of their own lifetime.  Second, the emphasis on 
the individual-as-agent leads to what psychoan alyst Adam Phillips describes 
as the impossible Liberal ideal of self-authorshi p - the idea that our lives and 
our actions are or should be entirely of our own choosing. Adding pressure 
upon the individual to make the most of this most limited resource.  The 
greatest sin now is to have not experienced, to have gone without. A duty that 
each person bears to themselves. Charging YOLO with ever greater urgency. 
The effect of this as Aries suggests, is the very modern possibility of one’s life 
being felt to be a failure: 
 
“Today the adult experiences sooner or later -and increasingly it is 
sooner-the feeling that he has failed, that his adult life has failed to 
achieve any of the promises of his adolescence”. 
 
And this for Aries is why death has become so unspeakably frightening, as he 
puts it: “When people started fearing death in earnest, they stopped talking 
about it.” 
 
The obvious irony of this circumstance is that, notwithstanding misfortune, 
we live longer now than ever before. We have, in Mercy’s words, “more life 
left”.  Yet we find ourselves in the peculiar position whereby death is at once 
further off and at the same time more imminent.  
The risk is that urgency of too great an order may sabotage the full life it 
appears to recommend.  That YOLO and the attitudes that underlie it are in 
some ways self-defeating; by further stoking feelings of haste they provoke 
either a paralysis of choice or a frantic attempt to fulfil multiple possibilities 
to the detriment of all.  
This paradox is foreshadowed in de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America: 
 
“It is strange to see with what feverish ardour the Americans pursue 
their own welfare, and to watch the vague dread that constantly 
torments them lest they should not have chosen the shortest path which 
may lead to it.   
 
Like these Americans, of whom I believe we are inheritors, it increasingly 
falls to us as individuals to trouble the question of what makes a good death, 
and in answering this, what makes a good life?  In the face of fewer certainties 
and greater choice, where failure is felt to be a real risk, a better question may 
be what makes a good enough life? 
 
// 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notes on Photography and Death:  Mourning, 
Spectacle, Evidence 
 
Anthony Luvera 
 
The inevitability and unpredictability of death is a fundamental part of what it 
means to be human. With much of the project of living spent seeking security 
and attempting to obtain and sustain control, it is the unknowingness of the 
timing and experience of death that makes it so confronting. Yet, attitudes to 
death are culturally constructed and coping mechanisms are formed through 
the meaning systems of social institutions. The social theorist Chris Shilling 
has argued that ‘conditions of high modernity have made the modern 
individual’s confrontation with death especially difficult… Death has become 
a particular existential problem for people as a result of modern forms of 
embodiment, rather than being a universal problem for human beings which 
assumes the same form irrespective of time or place’ (Shilling, C. (2003) The 
Body and Social Theory: 153). When once the occasion of death was once 
highly social, with public displays of mourning and events commonly taking 
place with the body of the deceased laid out to mark the occasion, now it is 
sequestered and privatised within institutions, and understood to be a problem 
for specialist knowledge and medical science. As the sociologist Norbert Elias 
observed, ‘never before have people died as noiselessly and hygienically as 
today… and never in social conditions fostering so much solitude’ (Elias, N. 
(1985) The Loneliness of the Dying: 85). Where once religion provided a 
‘sacred canopy… a shared vision of the world, the body and self-identity’ 
(Shilling 2003: 154) the increasingly secularised formation of Western societies 
has marginalised the communal spaces for death that once anaesthetised 
dread about the meaningless of living in the face of the unknowable event of 
death. 
 
The photographic medium is underwritten by death, in both the production 
and consumption of images across the contexts of art, science, commerce and 
personal photography, and in analysis of the histories and ontology of the 
photograph. Deathly analogies and characterisations have riven 
considerations of the photograph since its inception in the mid-nineteenth 
century to today. From as early as 1840 when Hippolyte Bayard posed as a 
corpse in protest at the lack of recognition by the French government for his 
photogenic inventions, through to Andre Bazin who described photography as 
form of embalming life in his influential essay, ‘The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image’ (1960). Susan Sontag likened to the indexicality of the 
photograph to a death mask, writing ‘all photographs are memento mori that 
enable participation in another’s mortality’ (Sontag, S. (1977) On Photography: 
154). And more recently, historians such as Geoffrey Batchen (1999; 2004; 
2009), Christian Metz (1985), Margaret Iversen (1994) and Audrey Linkman 
(2011) – to name a just a few – have all spoken of how the deathly qualities of 
photographs pose an uncanniness that might be seen as a return of the dead. 
 
The strongest influence on the talk of death that circulates in ontological 
discussions about photography reverberates out of Roland Barthes’s, Camera 
Lucida, (1980). In this text – arguably one of the cornerstones of contemporary 
photographic theory – Barthes has this to say: 
 
‘All those young photographers who are at work in the world, 
determined upon the capture of actuality, do not know they are 
agents of Death. This is the way in which our time assumes 
Death… For Death must be somewhere in society; if it is no 
longer (or less intently) in religion, it must be elsewhere; 
perhaps in this image which produces Death while trying to 
preserve life. Contemporary with the withdrawal of rites, 
Photography may correspond to the intrusion, in our modern 
society, of an asymbolic Death, outside of religion, outside of 
ritual, a kind of abrupt dive into literal Death. Life / Death: the 
paradigm is reduced to a simple click, the one separating the 
initial pose from the final print.’  
 
(Barthes 1980: 92) 
Barthes stretches this death analogy throughout his meditation on the 
qualities of the photograph – written while in mourning for the death of his 
mother – leading a number of critics to attest it has produced an overbearing 
melancholic tone in much subsequent consideration of the photographic 
medium. He argues that the temporality peculiar to the photograph is best 
thought of as an expression of the tautology of the French grammatical term 
future anterior, which loosely translates as ‘That has been’. Photography is a 
past tense medium. As they can only ever be seen after the actual moment 
depicted, photographs will always intimate death. 
 
Barthes’s comments about the marginalisation of space for death are just as 
relevant to our conversation here. As society has become increasingly 
secularised since the mid-nineteenth century – corresponding to the arrival of 
the photographic medium – space for Death is now primarily carved out in 
various forms of production and consumption of photographic representation. 
Communal responses and collective rites and rituals for death, dying and 
mourning have been tidied away while the hunger to view representations of 
death and dying has grown: reality programmes set in accident and 
emergency departments, documentaries about war, websites set up as spaces 
for memorialisation, and exhibitions in art and photography galleries – not to 
mention the deluge of violent films and television series that has arisen in 
recent decades. The forces of consumption that drive the production of the 
spectacle of death in contemporary culture might be likened to a fissure that 
forges its way around a blockage, as public audiences continue to seek out 
systems and spaces to try to obtain knowledge of death.  
 
So, how are we meant to view photographs of death when they are displayed 
in public? Burden of Proof: The Construction of Visual Evidence is an 
exhibition of images produced for very different contexts to the one in which 
they are now on show. The curator Diane Dufour contends this is an 
exhibition about the visual systems that gave rise to the production and 
articulation of the images – the product of professional practices of ‘evidence’ 
as constructed for the various quantitative purposes of judiciary systems. The 
crux of this is the interplay of a reliance on the image as documentation and 
the image as persuasion when tied to specific narratives, measurements, 
calculations, diagrams, testimonies or the architecture of a courtroom. While 
all photographs provide evidence of a sort – this happened then – the truth 
claims of the images in this exhibition are especially vulnerable when seen 
out of their original contexts. For as much as these images purport to show or 
reveal something about the act or effect of violent crime, it is what they lack 
that reveals both the ability and the ineptitude of images to harbour notions 
of truth.  
 
As a consideration of the role of images in the construction of evidence, 
Burden of Proof – by stealth or design – appears to me to do just as much to 
provide space for death as it satiates a public desire to see and to try to know 
death. To view images of or about death may not necessarily get us any closer 
to the truth of death, but the sting of their temporality is acute as they evoke 
the deathly riddles of the ontology of the photograph. 
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A Good Death 
 
Angela Eden 
 
Writing about Death in this digital age is different now than in the last few 
years. Then we had limited access to the business of dying and then only with 
our closest friends or family. Now, an endless stream of photos from around 
the world show us death and the dying. Invading our conscious world, we see 
barely covered corpses, limbs distorted, blurred outlines and human forms 
and ‘remains’. Death is everywhere and nowhere, in another place but not 
here. 
I wrote this poem thirty years ago, after witnessing an excruciating death in a 
hospital. Full of mechanics and little time or culture for emotional care. 
Despite some experienced and skilful nursing we were left, bereft. 
 
A death 
 
Death’s a dirty business 
At the worst of times 
And this death took its time 
While we waited 
Wanting to be there 
Wanting out 
 
I had imagined dying 
Peaceful, unblemished 
Full of quiet moments 
Gentle descent into sleep 
 
This was full of rage 
Full of disbelief 
Eyes bewildered confused 
Questioning the mess of it 
Finally overstressed 
A face stretched 
A silent scream 
Anger charging the body rigid 
Till his heart broke 
 
We the ones left 
Fell into each other 
Grateful for release 
For him, too much too long 
Enough 
 
Thank god there is no god 
That planned this 
Disaster called 
A blessed relief 
 
I now hold that rage 
That anger 
That all our science 
Had nothing for him 
Only our hands and eyes 
Buffering the violence 
Of the cruelty of death 
 
 
The poem is part of my experience of a ‘bad’ death, which makes me think 
about how we defend ourselves from the experience of dying, and the fear of 
being part of that moment. 
 
Apart from our intimate relationships we mostly experience death of the 
‘other’ as it happens in other places, defended from that pain by distance. In 
our current multi-media world we can see grief held in a mother’s posture and 
so we can mourn for her, but not for ourselves. 
 
It makes me reflect on a notion of the time when were we more intimate with 
death and dying. I assume there were fewer hospitals, no ambulances, or 
carefully muted wards; only practical deeds and words. Death was present, as 
integral to the family, and unavoidable. 
 
Our Unconscious builds a necessary defense to block the imagined pain, and 
helps us turn a blind eye to death. We are unwilling to let things die, and 
refuse to let death be alive in our conscious world. 
 
Some of this can be raced to our reverence, a vestigial class reverence, for the 
medical industry. The professional training takes years to master the 
complexity of the subject, the level of detail and accuracy. The recognition of 
that skill and experience allows us to build an unconscious deification. 
 
They are the ones that face death on our behalf. They cut out bits of our 
bodies, inject us with drugs anaesthetise us, and offer solutions to our body 
pain. No wonder we choose to respect their role and their power. 
Only recently have we heard about the stress of the job. How the long hours 
and increasing budget restrictions increase illness and suicide, theirs and ours. 
Now we understand that they too are as frail as us. We are all defended 
against the reality of our own fragility. 
Something in our current and defended western culture has lost a respect and 
a reverence for age. The really elderly are tucked away, sheltered by care into 
invisibility as we/they drift towards death. 
As I write in October 2015, there is a flurry of news as UK is reported as having 
the best palliative care. It makes me re-think my perspective on how we face 
death, and rush to websites to re-examine my position. 
“Palliative care is an approach that improves the quality of life of 
patients and their families facing the problem associated with life-
threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by 
means of early identification and impeccable assessment and treatment 
of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial and 
spiritual.”  (World Health Organization) 
Have we now delegated this conversation about a good death to a specialised 
group of professionals? The ordinary-ness of death has been cloaked into 
invisibility. Maybe even disguised by a white coat. 
So how then can we ask what is a ‘good’ death and develop a culture that talks 
of death before it arrives. We need to build a practice that includes the ability 
to talk about and face the truth about the future? 
I wonder if the defense is not against dying but mourning. The ‘best’ deaths 
are with people who find a way to make the transition, in full consciousness 
and with awareness. Dying slowly after a full life, without regrets, is the hoped 
for way to go. Dying - unexpectedly, young, accidentally, or in pain - is 
dreaded most by those who are left. 
So what is the place for analytic forensic work? I hope that preparing for 
death is part of understanding our personal history of death and mourning. I 
hope that by digging into and past our defenses any future death will be 
contained. There is, I believe, an intimacy in being close to death and a 
consciousness of ending that can be full of living. 
 
// 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Death, Beliefs and Respect 
 
Philip Stokoe 
 
On Christmas day 1964 the most important man in my life, my grandad, died. 
On 25th of September 1965 my younger brother died. Halfway between these 
two events I turned 14. 
One very close friend of mine died when I was 43 and another less than a year 
ago. The most important man in my life, my dad, is 90.  Whether through 
these experiences or a bizarre quirk in my nature that requires me to face 
reality, now that I’m now 64, I find I spend a significant amount of my time 
thinking about death.  
 
For many years, desperate to believe it does not all end when we die, I sought 
evidence for a spiritual existence after death, and for God that would enable 
this, but I didn’t find either. 
 
Many people want to believe in a superior being who has a particular interest 
in them personally, because they can’t cope with the idea that there is no God 
and no afterlife. They think it would mean two things; that there is no 
constraint or restraint on you – so you can do whatever you like, and that this 
must inevitably leave you unbearably depressed. 
 
So far as the former is concerned, I have tried very hard to live a life without 
restraint, one in which I can indulge my ‘Id impulses’. I have to report failure 
in this regard; in spite of every effort, I find myself concerned about other 
people’s feelings, vulnerabilities or pain. It turns out that those things 
described as ethics or morals exist even without the pompous claim made by 
some organised religions seem to make - that without their strictures about 
human behaviour, anarchy would rule. In fact observations of so-called 
primitive societies seem to demonstrate that cooperation and mutual respect 
are the features that make them work. 
 
The second assumption believers make about life without a God is that it is 
depressed. My own experience is the exact opposite; the knowledge that this is 
all there is increases my motivation to get the most out of life. 
 
Having escaped from the thrall of an omnipotent God, I have become aware 
of something much more ‘anti-life’ than an absence of a belief in a God, and 
that is the presence of ‘beliefs’ of the kind that are taken to be ‘facts’. I really 
am not objecting here to everyday beliefs; the way I see it is that we hold 
beliefs as a kind of temporary state of mind until we have tested them to find 
how true they are. We can’t think of them as facts because they have not been 
fully tested yet. What disturbs me are those beliefs that Ron Britton described 
as ‘unconscious’ beliefs. If we are aware of them at all, we think of them 
simply as facts of life. These beliefs, held by a single person, can be evaluated 
by others and rejected or accepted. It is when groups of people come to share 
the same unconscious beliefs that things can become dangerous. A single 
individual who claims as a statement of fact that communists are plotting to 
destroy his way of life will probably be recognised as having a mental health 
problem, but when such an individual gathers around him a whole group of 
people who share the same view, it is called McCarthyism and is extremely 
dangerous. 
 
Wilfred Bion has shown us that the usual interpretation of Descartes’ ‘cogito 
ergo sum’, namely that thinking is natural to human beings was wrong, and 
that far from being innate, it is a skill that needs to be acquired and requires 
effort to maintain. Under pressure, when anxiety is high, we all of us collapse 
into a fundamentalist state of mind in which everything is sharply divided 
between right and wrong or good and bad. In this state of mind certainty 
becomes admirable, and thinking (which is predicated on not knowing) is 
denigrated. This is the state of mind that looks for beliefs that can be treated 
as facts. 
 
Since Margaret Thatcher’s time, we have been fed a belief that the less 
fortunate in our society are scroungers, lazy people looking to steal from 
those who are better off. Our current government have been pushing the 
same idea. 
 
The trouble with this idea is that it focuses on material acquisitions - money 
and possessions. The idea of somebody taking from us something that we 
value immediately conjures anxiety, which pushes us into the fundamentalist 
state of mind I referred to earlier. One of the effects this produces is that we 
are distracted from examining our own emotional experience in the face of 
generosity. When we hear stories of other people’s generosity, it gives us a 
good feeling. The same is true when we ourselves are able to be generous; it 
makes us feel better. It seems to me that an essential characteristic of a 
civilised society is the creation of a community, which looks after those who 
are needy. This characteristic makes for a dignified society; we lose dignity 
when we turn the needy within our society into bad people unworthy of our 
concern. 
 
We are at a critical point in the history of social Britain; successive 
governments, building on a fear of welfare scroungers, have been destroying 
that amazing thing created after the Second World War which, even at a time 
when the country was in enormous debt, gave us dignity - the welfare state. 
The moment we fall for the trick that measures love, concern and compassion 
in financial terms, we have lost dignity and our claim to humanity. 
 
The death that I am most concerned about today is the death of our 
compassionate state. This death is not necessary, this death is artificially 
contrived, this death is murder. 
 
// 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Shadow of the Object 
 
Tom DeRose 
 
In Part 3 of László Krasznahorkai’s novel Satantango, entitled ‘To Know 
Something’, we are introduced to a character called the doctor, whose 
existence seems to be wholly structured around obsessive routines to the 
extent that he has become completely devitalised. He sits by the window and 
watches and records the actions of every individual who comes into his field 
of vision. In order to facilitate this endless stream of observation and 
cataloguing, the doctor has, 
 
‘collected and arranged, in an optimal fashion, all that was necessary for 
eating, drinking, smoking, daily writing and reading, as well as the 
countless other necessary details of everyday life.’ 
 
If, ‘one matchstick or brandy glass’ is out of place, ‘chaos would ensue 
and all would be lost’. 
 
For a reader of Freud, these words will no doubt conjure up associations 
around his famous case study The Rat Man (Notes upon a Case of Obsessional 
Neurosis). The doctor’s researches betray a fascination with the ‘sexual instinct 
of looking and knowing’ (scopophilia and epistemophilia), which Freud 
suggests are developed early and subsequently repressed by Obsessive 
Neurotics. 
 
By permanently fixing the objects surrounding him, and thus denying the 
possibility of contingency, the doctor poses what for Psychoanalyst Serge 
Leclaire is the Obsessive Neurotic question, ‘am I alive or dead?’ or 
alternatively ‘am I subject or object?’ We can interpret the doctor’s behaviour 
as an attempt to answer these questions; by ‘freezing becoming’ the doctor has 
created a state of eternal presence, in which time is spatialised and death is at 
once affirmed and denied. Like T. S. Eliot’s Prufrock, the doctor has ‘measured 
out my life in coffee spoons’.  
 
The Obsessive Neurotic then creates a death-in-life, in order to defend himself 
from chaos, a state in which people and things alike are composed (but not 
decomposed) in to a protective constellation. In this constellation each 
element is first defined and then ordered, and it is only then that the defence 
can operate effectively. Death and chaos then appear to be intrinsically 
related. 
 
How then can we understand death? How can we represent the 
unrepresentable? The objects in the doctor's study, like photographs of 
cadavers, are merely place-holders, signposts to something that is 
fundamentally other; to absence. There is no place for death in the Freudian 
unconscious. As experiencing beings, death can only be conceptualised 
against the bedrock of our own castration (we experience the death of others 
as it affects us, not as the thing itself). When the ‘death instinct’ finally enters 
the Freudian theatre in 1920, it appears as a speculative concept, empty of 
content, which seeks the organism's return to the inorganic; singing, as it 
were, from the wings rather than from centre stage. 
 
It is perhaps, by looking in more detail at the state of chaos, that we can help 
to gain a closer insight in to the elusive concept of death. In Freud’s paper 
Mourning and Melancholia (1915), there are some clues that can help us 
elucidate this relationship. Here, Freud argues that the difference between the 
‘normal’ state of mourning and the ‘pathological’ state of melancholia is that 
in the former state the ego mourns the loss of a known object (a loved one 
perhaps), whereas in the latter state the mourned object is unconscious; we 
may know whom we are mourning, but not ‘what we have lost’. Drawing on 
the conceptual apparatus he developed in his 1914 paper On Narcissism, Freud 
suggests that the critical agency (which would later become the super-ego) 
identifies the ego with the lost object, and this results in the ‘self-accusations, 
and the ‘depletion of the ego’ which are so prevalent in the state of 
melancholia. In this way, ‘the shadow of the object falls over the ego’. What is 
hinted at then in Freud’s account of the mechanism of melancholia is the 
production of a state, which replicates the earliest stage of psychic 
development, a stage of indifferentation between the ego and its future 
objects.  
 
The English word ‘chaos’ is curiously ambiguous. It can evoke a feeling of 
frantic aimless activity, but it can also suggest formlessness and 
indifferntiation. For Milton in Book One of Paradise Lost, Chaos is that from 
which the ‘Heavens and Earth’ arose. That it precedes the very first separation 
(in psychoanalytic terms the separation between ego and object) is, I think, 
crucial in our attempt to approach an understanding of death through the 
concept of chaos. 
 
The doctor’s obsessive practices in Satantango can be seen as an attempt to 
uphold separation in the face of chaos, however in Freud’s conception of 
melancholia, the boundary, which has upheld this separation (between ego 
and object) has collapsed. The collapsing of this boundary is explored by Lars 
Von Trier in his film Melancholia, in which he presents two parallel 
narratives; one the account of a woman’s severe depression, and the other the 
slow and inexorable approach of a mysterious planet called Melancholia. 
Justine (the main character) is indifferent to the objects that surround her 
(her fiancé, her family, and finally to her favourite horse which she 
mercilessly beats when it refuses to move), and it appears as if she herself is 
pulling the planet towards the earth, with which it eventually collides, 
bringing death. 
 
In the opening scene of Melancholia, Von Trier hints at the seductive pull 
that exerts itself on the ego, as the two planets collide in an eroticised fusion, 
like the siren song pulling Odysseus towards the rocks. Julia Kristeva, in her 
book Black Sun writes that the melancholic is not mourning an object but the 
‘Thing’, or ‘the real that does not lend itself to signification, the centre of 
attraction and repulsion, seat of sexuality from which the object of desire will 
be separated’. Here I believe we come close to a definition of the chaos against 
which our doctor is defending himself with his frozen world, and which the 
melancholic is enticed towards. 
 
How then are we to steer a course between the Scylla of fusion with the 
seductive ‘Thing’ and the Charybdis of the Obsessive’s defence? This is the 
self-appointed task of Psychoanalysis- the ‘talking cure’ which states as its 
objective the reanimation of the subject through the desire-producing power 
of language; or, more succinctly; ‘to get her to speak’. 
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The Scene of the Crime 
 
Elizabeth Cotton 
 
This was not the piece about death I was planning on writing. It was supposed 
to be a turn on Hauntology and listening to the Smiths. A pretty piece skirting 
around death, a riff on our obsession with the 1980s, mourning and a neat 
segue into the impact of economic depression. 
 
And then Paris happened. 
 
Like many people of an artistic persuasion, on Friday 13th November I’d 
travelled for Paris Photo, and to meet my twin sister who was visiting from 
NYC to launch her new book. A visit to Collette and a binge on Fruits de Mer. 
Literally magic. 
 
On Friday we’d shopped on Rue de Charonne and went for dinner just round 
the corner. Since we were off the pop we walked home early, stopping outside 
La Belle Equipe to breath in the lovely young folk, and joked that if we still 
drank we’d be at the bar hoping that their beauty would rub off. Ten minutes 
later we heard that 19 people had been killed there.  
 
In just ten minutes my mind had become the scene of a crime.  
 
Fragments 
 
I’m left with fragments, unable to pull them or myself together. 
 
An American curator, and much loved x-colleague, catches us taking pictures 
of cakes just off the Bastille, before the shootings take place. An intense 
exchange about politics, class and sexism. How to help her two teenage 
daughters navigate a school of angry porn addicted boys. How to stop men 
trolling my sister and hiding behind their beards. A fierce conversation 
between women of substance.  
 
The sounds of sirens for 5 hours into the night. Realisation dawning.  
 
The face of a beautiful young black woman singing at La Belle Equipe.  
 
A tearful conversation with our parents, steadying them for a night of worry 
ahead. 
 
A Paris guide book on the table, page marked for music venues. 
 
Saturday morning watching my sister dip into a bag of magic tricks and put 
on her make up before we venture out to find food. She looks disapprovingly 
at my outfit tutting that I can’t make it into the shower. I remind her that in 
every photograph of her since the age of 3 she carries a handbag full of very 
important things. Has ever been the way.  
 
The butcher’s on Saturday. A familiar Grand Madame unwilling to confirm or 
deny the system for getting served. Her assistant who made me taste 
everything before purchase, nudging me towards the Lapin en Croute. Safety 
in the old ways. Everything tastes of metal. 
 
The immaculate American couple in their 60s in a Marais cafe, complaining 
about the table and bitching about the art world. She has not eaten for several 
decades and he is gay. They order foie gras and chips. A sudden rush to be 
reunited with the body. 
 
Late night tears, the infant fear of the lights going out. My twin cheers me 
with a discussion about Tenko - the 1980s series about women in a Japanese 
prison of war camp. We remember the character we loved who died trying to 
get a lipstick so she could kiss a man. We believed profoundly that she wanted 
the lipstick more than the man. I asked Charlotte how many lipsticks she had. 
She had four and listed them in order of preference. I asked her if we had to 
choose between food and lipstick which would it be. She thoughtfully 
answered that she would need to keep all of them except the new lipgloss that 
makes her lips sore. I cherished every single serious word she said like a bed 
time story.  
 
Then the hardest part, saying goodbye to Paris and each other. A young 
photographer stops my sister as we walk through Gare du Nord. Her gentle 
response at his ambition compelling him to apologetically network amongst 
the devastation. She touches his arm and asks him if he’s OK. I am filled with 
pride at her kindness. 
 
Twinning as Defence 
 
For many of us the shock of Paris returns us to a place of trauma and feelings 
that we fashion our whole lives to avoid. Whether through intellectualisations 
or art, knowledge or a religious belief in our school of thought, we all try to 
keep away from staring into the existential abyss. Overwhelmed by the 
insecurity of life and the certainty of death.  
 
Twinning in this sense is a psychic defence. A union of the same, a panic room 
safe from the reality of actual human relationships with other different and 
separate people. A fantasy of two being one, names get exchanged and 
subjectivity at best ambiguous.  
 
This twinning can be of great comfort to the people involved and the 
witnesses of their idyllic state. Always there to protect each other from the 
hard facts of life. That we are different and alone, and that we all die.  
 
One of the hardest things about being a twin is the thought of how to live 
without each other. Inevitably at some point one of you will lose your twin - 
whether through the organic process of growing up and separating or a more 
dramatic tearing. I remember an early unspoken dialogue with my twin, how 
to live without each other. Please let me go first.  
 
I write these words as if they are just Sudoku,  a puzzle to be solved. But the 
loss of my twin poses a deep existential crisis. How can there be life with death 
when you are a twin? 
 
My Internal Terrorist 
 
In response to this unanswered question, over the days that follow the 13th 
November the rage that explodes in me is hard to contain. What Bion calls the 
‘chaos monster’ was unleashed. 
 
The rage at my own vulnerability making me psychically violent. An internal 
terrorist not interested in the dynamic world of human life, instead 
everything reduced to black and white. 
 
My BFF Thanatos and the seduction of a Nirvana fantasy offering a final 
solution to fear.  
 
Many of us on the left hide behind our ideological or intellectual defences, 
and retreat into a religiosity and righteousness. This is a state of mind where 
beliefs become facts, combined with our sadistic superegos which demand we 
save the world. It is at this point that being right turns into being self-
righteous. 
 
When something like Paris shocks the world, we can be so afraid of our own 
vulnerability that we become a martyr to the cause. These defences turn the 
world into black and white,  them’s and us’s - denying the reality that violence 
threatens our links to each other making us profoundly alone. 
 
Brothers and Sisters 
 
Anxiety can do bad stuff to people. For many of us it is a return to a 
traumatised state where mind is separated from body. Connections and links 
are broken and the world gets split into good and bad. An entire work life 
devoted to solidarity and the good deeds of the left and I don’t care about 
anyone except my twin. 
 
And then seven days later, my love for psychoanalysis kicks in. For many 
people psychoanalysis is not an intellectual defence, rather an emancipatory 
practice, that gets stuck into the blood and guts of overthrowing my internal 
terrorist. The part of me that wants to destroy anything that does not share 
my exact DNA. 
 
Psychoanalysis has given me a ‘third’ position that frees me from this binary 
monochrome world. Quite unexpectedly and uncharacteristically, I feel 
gratitude to my analyst. The many years wrestling with psychoanalytic ideas 
and a painful process of development has, despite my defiance in the face of 
change, taken place. It is this that now comes into play, helping me maintain 
myself - psychically and emotionally - even in the face of great loss.  
 
I celebrate my newfound adulthood by no longer referring to my analyst as 
The Butcher, and calling him by his actual name. Just a man who took the 
time to help me see the parts of myself that I could not bear to do alone.  
 
The process of living a full life requires us to accept some facts of life which 
include our separateness from others and our own mortality. It also includes 
the painful knowledge that we are inevitably dependent on the people around 
us. People who are not like us, not our twin, who are not perfectly attuned to 
our needs.  
 
In a context of violence, one of the great seductions is to believe that we are 
united in our trauma. Our actual experience can be that when the balance tips 
in favour of fear our relationships easily break down. Betrayals, mistakes and 
withdrawal from the people we love, our wounds sometimes too deep for the 
other to get close.  
 
This traumatic reality presents us with a massive dilemma. How to stay 
connected to the people around us when everything in us wants to run 
screaming into the hills? 
 
Solidarity is not a union of like minded folk who would never hurt each other. 
Solidarity as an ideal exists precisely because we are all capable of acting 
defensively and against our own human interests. In a context of violence, if 
there is a fight to be had it is a psychological one. To continue to take the risk 
of practicing solidarity by making contact with other people who are not the 
same as us. A relational model of solidarity.  
 
Sometimes the very best we can do is to be just human amongst other 
humans. Sisters and brothers, but not twins. 
 
// 
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